This study uses both a net factor content analysis and a small simulation model to explore the impact on the U.S. developing countries.
Most recent studies of the links between trade and wages have looked backwards, considering the impact of trade on the labor market over the past two decades. But the rapid increase in US trade with developing countries over this period can be expected to continue into the future. Indeed, the pace and volume could grow dramaticallyy if India joins China and other Asian countries in successful export-led growth. It is this specter of billions of new lowwage workers being drawn into the labor market, which has led many in the popu Iar press to predict a bleak future for low-wage workers in the developed countries. (Goldsmith 1993) In this paper, we therefore construct a scenario which allows us to study the impact of a very large increase in such trade.
We will present evidence which suggests that while growing international trade between the United States and developing countries could lead to lower relative and real wages for unskilled workers, the fears of large absolute and relative wage losses for less-skilled workers appear misplaced. If sustained over the next fifteen years, an expansion in trade between the US and the developing countries at the double-digit pau of the past decade would bring about a major change in the structure of US manufacturing production. In particular, the US could see a decline in large segments of its basic industrial activities as these are replaced by imports from emerging markets. However, matching this decline will bean expansion of skill intensive activities that will provide an offsetting source of growth.
We find that while trade could effect major shifts in the structure of US production, iĩ mpact on the wage structure is unlikely to be large. 3 The basic reason for this small impact is 3 This analysis draws on Lawrence (1996) .
2 that manufacturing in general, and those sectors potential y vulnerable to developing country competition in particular, comprise a relatively small share of total employment. Once the US economy is driven to specialize fully in skill-intensive products, trade no longer widens the relative wage gap.
The factor price equalization theorem leads some to predict"that fr~trade with developing countries will drive the wages of unskilled US workers down to Chinese or Indian levels. But the theorem only holds under conditions of incomplete specialization. Once countries become fully s~ialimd, the strong links between international wages and product prices break down.
For example, if a country has no domestic production of clothing, imports of clothing will no longer directly affect wages. One way for firms in developed economies to avoid head-to-head competition with develop ing countries, therefore, is to specialize in producing products which are not imported from developing countries. Under these conditions, wages and other factor prices in the developed countries will be determined only by the goods and services that they actually produce: namely, those that are exported and those that are not traded. Put more simply, the floor on the wages of unskilled workers in the developed countries is not what workers earn in the textile industries of Chim and India, but what they can earn if they are employed in export and domestic industries. It is this floor which we seek to estimate.
Part II: The Experiment
The type of shock we are considering can be illustrated in Figure 2 which illustrates the production possibilities frontier of the traded goods sector. The US star~from a position of autarky;4 trade with developing countries then expands until the economy becomes fully specialized, moving outside the zone of diversification to a corner solution in which only exportable are produced. Note that our shock arises purely from "trade", i.e. it represents changes in the trading opportunities presented to us by the rest of the world. Technology, tastes, and factor supplies, all of which potentially influence trade volumes, are held constant throughout.
me Net Futor Content Approach
Since some economists have been extremely critical of the net-factor content approach on which we will partly rely it is important that we explain our methodological choice. In particular, Bhagwati and Dehejia (1994) , hwrence and Slaughter (1993) , and Learner (1995) have all emphasized that trade volumes might not be good indicators of trade pressures.
Indeed, one can thiti of examples in which just the threat of increased imports could drive domestic wages down without leading to increased trade flows. These authors therefore prefer paying attention to price evidence. If trade lowered the relative wages of unskilled workers, we would also expect to see a decline in the relative prices of goods which are produced using unskilled labor relatively intensively.
But as pointed out by Deardorff and Staiger (1988) and more recently by Krugman (1995) and Learner (1996) , the net factor content approach is useful and not inconsistent with a consideration of prices provided the investigation is considering a fairly precise question. In 4 The initial autarkic point is used to provide benchmark prices at which the economy initially trades. particular, the approach can be used to study the impact on relative factor prices of a particular change in trading opportunities, for example, the impact of imposing prohibitive trade barriers. s Moreover, in a log-linear economy, with Cobb-Douglas utility and production functions, the net factor content calculations have an appealing feature because changes in the net factor content of trade as a proportion of total factor supplies give rise to proportional changes in relative factor prices.
The major problem in applying this approach empirically to explain historical episodes is that it requires assuming that the trade flows actual] y observed in the trading opportunities available and not by other changes were caused only by the change such as technology, tastes and relative factor supplies, which might also be expected to influence such flows. In practice, this assumption will not hold, and it is not easy to identify these effects separately because they are interactive. Changes in demand, factor supplies, technology, and opportunities to trade internationally could all affect the composition of trade, ou~ut, and relative product and factor prices. In particular, as Deardorff and Hakura (1994) have emphasized, the volume of trade is an endogenous variable which is simultaneously determined with wages. If trade is generated by a decline in trade barriers at home or abroad the impacts on wages could be very different than if trade is generated by changes in tastes or technology.
The studies of trade in the past all suffer from the problem of isolating the effects of trade precisely. In a runt article, Learner (1996) claims that because of the problems we have just 5 The rwon, as Deardorff and Staiger (1988) show, is that any given trade equilibrium can be msociated with an equivalent autarky equilibrium in which factor endowments are changed by the amounts of the factor content of trade. "Since factor prims in autarky are related to factor endowments, it follows that factor prices with trade are related to its factor content. " discussd thenetfactor content approach isofextremely limited use.b Learner emphasizes that the net factor content approach can (only) be used to compare two equilibria that have the same tastes, technologies, and factor supplies and that differ only in terms of external trading opportunities. But accepting these restrictions, the net factor content approach is actually a useful starting point for studying the shock we are interested in'this paper, namely a dramatic future expansion in America's opportunities to trade. Moreover, because we can set up a precise experiment, we can actually learn about the past by looking at the future.
fie fiperiment bt us explore the implications of a very large expansion in U.S. manufactured goods trade using data on the US economy in 1990. We obtain an upper bound impact on the US labor market by resuming that industries which compete with manufactured imports from developing countries are totally eliminated. The US shifts into non-competing industries, and workers find jobs in sectors producing exports or non-traded goods and services.
Which industries are potentially most vulnerable to competition from developing countries? Table 1 lists US industries ranked according to the share of full time workers with a high school education or less--"high-school workers" --in the labor form in 1990.7 The industries range from Tobacco, in which high school workers accounted for just 43 percent of employment, to Apparel in which they constituted 85 percent.
s The analysis using prices encounters the same problems.
7 Industry SIC 29, petroleum refining, has been excluded.
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The industries seem to fall into two distinct groups. There is one group of seven industries in which high-school employment shares range from 43 to 53 percent and a second group with shares ranging betwwn 65 and 85 percent, There are no two digit industries between 53 and 65 percent. This suggests a natural division. The first group, we define as "high-skill" industries. It includes printing and tobacco plus the industries hat are usually classified as "high-tech" namely chemicals, machinery and instruments. The second group, which we define as "basic, " includes all other manufacturing industries.
Clearly, given the level of aggregation, this is a fairly crude approximation, but it does have quite strong predictive value with respect to trade with developing countries. The highskill industries accounted for about three quarters of all US manufactured exports to developing countries, while the basic industries accounted for almost sixty percent of US manufactured imports from developing countries. Mormver, exports to developing countries munt for much higher shares of value added in the high-skill industries (11 percent) than in the basic industries (5 percent). On the other hand, the ratio of manufactured imports to domestic value-added is much higher for low skill (15 permnt) than for high-skill (8 percent).
.
This classification of US industries suggests an extreme scenario in which the US becomes fully specialized in high-skill products. In this scenario, as reported in Table 2 , the US completely replaces the 1990 domestic value-added of $552 billion which was produd in these bmic industries with imports from developing countries.
production) of the high-skill industries expand by an additional
In turn, exports (and $552 billion in proportion to their 1990 output shares. This is clearly a very dramatic scenario. In 1990, US impo~from developing countries of manufactured goods amounted to $140 billion. In the alternative 7 scenario they are assumed to increase to $690 billion --in other words, there is a five-fold increase. If this increase took place over a fifteen year period it would correspond to an annual growth rate of 11.3 percent. These effects would build up over time and become larger in later years when trade volumes are larger. After 10 years, only about half of the effects would be felt.
As reported in Table 2 , given constant ratios of inputs to outputs, this switch eliminates the demand for the 8.7 million workers employed in basic industries (6.4 million high-school workers and 2.3 million college workers. ) On the other hand, the increase in value-added of the high-skill manufacturing sector by $552 billion raises demand for 7.6 million workers split evenly between high-school and college workers. All told therefore, this substitution results in an excess supply of 2.6 million high school workers and an excess demand for 1.5 million college workers. Given this alternative production structure for manufacturing, with no change in relative wages, the demanded mnomy-wide employment ratio of high-school to mllege workers is 88.2 percent. In fact, in 1990, the supply ratio of these workers was 95.4 percent.~us as compared to 1990, the relative demund for high school workers would decline by 7.5 percent. To clear the labor market, therefore, the relative wage of high-school
workers would have to fall to encourage firms in both high-skill manufacturing and the nonmanufacturing economy to hire more high-school and fewer college workers. A key question, therefore, is the sensitivity of the relative demand for different types of workers to relative wages --the elasticity of substitution. The literature provides a wide range of estimates. 8 If BFor a survey see Hamermesh (1986) .
we assume this elasticity is unity, we obtain a proportional decline in the relative wages of high-school workers i.e. 7.5 percent. 9
Product Pr ce and Real Wa?e Cm. i Thus far the analysis has estimated the impact of trade on relative wages. We know however, from trade theory, that in this scenario the real wage of skilled workers will rise and the real wage of unskilled workers will fall. To obtain explicit relative price and real wage effects associated with this scenario, we now simulate the scenario with a general equilibrium, two-factor, three sector model calibrated on 1990 US data. Appendix I contains
Description of Model.
a more detailed description of the model.
The model has a non-traded goods sector which accounts for 83 percent of mnsumption and high-skill and basic manufacturing industries which acmunt for 10 and 7 percent respectively. The sectors turn out to be roughly mirror images. In basic manufacturing, unskilled labor receives 62 percent of income, whereas in high-skill manufacturing its share is 37 percent. Initially, the model has Cobb-Douglas production and consumption functions and is parametrized using the data in Table 1 . The parametrization is very close to, but not precisely the same as the net factor content scenario for wmputational reasons.
Tables 3 to 5 describe some important parameters of the model and the simulation results.
The first striking feature of the model is the flatness of the production function, confirming a result noted by Johnson (1966) many years ago. A decline in the relative price of basic 9 Deardorff and Staiger (1988) show that if product expenditures and factor shares remain constant shares of income, the change in relative wages will be proportional to the changes in total relative factor supplies represented by changes in the net factor content of trade. 9 manufactures of just 1.8 percent suffices to drive the economy to complete specialization.
(See Table 3 ) This reemphasizes the importanw of the magnification effect --i.e. that relatively small changes in prices can have fairly large effects on relative wages. The real wages of high-school workers fall by 4.4 percent, while the real wages of college workers rise by 2.9 percent, leading to about the same relative wage shift as obtained in the net factor content calculations.
It is noteworthy that while the effects of trade on the distribution of income are substantial, the impact on real income is small --this might be expected given the 7% share of basic manufactures in consumption and the decline in relative import prices under two percent.
Indeed, overall real income in the economy rises by just one twentieth of one percent.
Qual@catiom eters. In Table 3 , we also explore the sensitivity of our results to alternative estimates. 10 As reported, a lower elasticity of substitution in consumption (of 0.5) does not lead to major changes in the results. This gives rise to a slightly larger relative price effect (-2, Opercent) and a fall in relative unskilled wages by 7.6 percent, divided between a decline in real high-school wages of 4.7 percent and an increase in college wages of 3.2 percent. By contrast, lowering the elasticity of substitution in production to 0.5 does have a considerable impact, leading to changes in relative prices of 4.1 percent and 14.9 percent split between a decline in real wages of high-school workers by relative wages of 9.1 percent and 10Note that these simulations use CES production and utility functions. an increase in real college wages by 6.9 permnt.
The literature is divided on which parameter is appropriate. Katz and Murphy (1992) in a aggregative estimate obtain an elasticity of 1.41. Sachs and Shatz (1995) by contrast argue for parameters of between 0.3 and 0.5. 11In his survey Hamermesh (1986) gives a wide range of estimates. When these are estimated using cost functions they range betwmn zero and 3.7 with a mean of about unity. As Adrian Wood pointi out econometric estimates of the elasticity of substitution probably capture not only the pure factor substitution effect in producing a given product but also the effects induced by different factor prices on product mix and quality. 12 Wood argues this is a problem for the simulation he wishes to perform and therefore uses lower estimates to capture only the substitution possibilities in producing a specific bundle of goods. However, for our purposes, the induced effects are also relevant since they would come into play in response to changes in relative factor prices in response to trade and thus moderate the impact of trade on factor prices, This leads us to conclude that estimates of the elasticity in the range of unity appear reasonable, indeed could be mnsemative.
-.
By using data from 1990 we ignored two important considerations that lead to an overstatement of these effects. First, we overlooked that over a fifteen year period, there will be productivity improvements. Indeed, over a fifteen year period, with output per worker in 11Note if the elasticity of substitution is low it implies that the impact of W trade and skillb-technical change will be larger for any given displawment of labor. For a more complete exploration see Lawrence and Evans (1996) .
'2For more discussion see Wood (1994) , pp. 132-134. manufacturing increasing at the 2.5 percent annual rate it averaged between 1979 and 1994, for example, the employment impact of these shifts would be reduced by 44 percent.
(Alternatively, we could think of these as scenarios in which developing country could be larger by 44 percent to have the estimated effects.) Taking productivity trade volumes growth into acmunt, therefore, suggests that an 11.3 percent annual growth rate over fifteen years in imports from developing countries would reduce the relative demand for high school workers by O. 56 * 7.5 = 4.1 percent in the case of a percent with an elasticity of substitution equal school wages of between 2.5 and 6.2 percent.
unitary elasticity of substitution and by 9.2 to 0.5.
This is
This would imply declines in real hightherefore a more realistic estimate of the displacement effects of the volume effects in the scenario.
Second, the US labor force is like]y to grow over this period at an annual rate of around one percent. This implies that the employment shifts represented by these trade flows will represent relatively smaller shares of the labor force. Assuming a proportional increase in the ratio of high-school to college workers, this would reduce the estimates of relative wage changes implied by these trade volumes of an additional fifteen percent, i.e. to .85 * 4.1 = 3.5 percent with an elasticity of substitution equal to unity and 7.82 percent with an elasticity of substitution of .5, yielding real wage declines for unskilled workers of between 2.1 and 5.3 percent, when we account for both growth and productivity changes. Actually since the supply of more ducated workers will rise relatively rapidly these effects are likely to be even smaller.
w.
The simulations have assumed that average wages earned by high-school and college workers are the same throughout the economy. But in fact, there are differences. Katz and Summers (1989) estimate these wage premiums for two-digit manufacturing for managers and laborers. Ascribing their estimates of rents for managers to mllege workers and for laborers to high-school workers suggests that on average the rents of managers and workers in basic industries are 6 and 2 percent respectively, while for college and high-school workers in high skill industries on average they are 15 and 13 percent Thus, given these rents, the shift in employment from the basic to the high skill sector would increase average rents for both types of workers. This would be the source of additional gains from trade. 13 On average, for employment shifts laid out in the net factor content scenario described above, average mnomy-wide rents earned by high-school and college workers would rise by 0.7 and 0.8 of one percent respective y. Taking these into account therefore leaves the impact of trade on relative wages unchanged, but using the estimates which account for both productivity and labor force growth imply real wages declines of unskilled workers of 1.3 and 4.5 percent for elasticities of substitution of 1 and 0.5 respectively.
. We have taken the relative supplies and demands for these factors as given, But there are likely to be responses in both demand and supply which will reduce this effwt, On the demand side, technological innovation could occur which saves on the use of college workers and makes more intensive use of high-school workers. On the supply side, the lower relative wage of high-school workers imp]ies an increase in the return to education. If it induces workers and new labor force entrants to invest more in education, this will reduce the relative supply of high-school workers and bolster their relative wages.
13Indeed Katz and Summers (1989) find that US export industries provide higher wage premiums tha; those mmpeting with imports.
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Services Trti. This scenario should not be taken as an accurate forecast of the specific sectors that are likely to be affected by trade with manufacturing. Indeed it is likely that even in the face of increased imports of the size we have considered many of the basic industries will suwive and some of the high-skill will not. However, the exercise should be seen as a parable which indicates orders of magnitude when unskill--intensive sectors are displaced.
Thus some of these could be in the servius sector rather than manufacturing.
however, an important question of whether even these orders of magnitude are There is, too small because improvements in communications could dramatically increased the scope of what may be traded. In particular, as an example in the low skill area, data processing activities once performed domestically in OECD countries are increasing y undertaken abroad. On the other hand, even high-skill firms are finding it feasible to use software and other talented engineers in developing countries. Nonetheless, if the experience in goods trade is indicative, it remains likely that services trade between OECD and developing countries will occur mainly along skill lines, with the OECD exporting skill-intensive services and importing unskilled-intensive services. The literature on the potential for providing long distance services has been surveyed by the World Bank (1995) .14 It reports studies showing that an estimated 12 to 16 percent of employment in services in the G7 engage in services that could technically be provided at long distance. However, there are many activities that for strategic rwons, such as preserving proprietary information, companies are reluctant to outsource, particularly internationally. The Bank therefore estimates that between 1 and 5 percent of the total employment in services in 14World Bank (1995), Chapter 3. Apptiently, therefore, the overwhelming majority of output outside of manufacturing will remain non-traded.
If the manufacturing sector was disaggregated further than we have done here, it is likely that somewhat larger estimates could be obtained since a finer division might lead to somewhat higher high-school to college ratios for those workers who are displaced and somewhat lower ratios for the jobs that are added in export industries. Stacking the industries using a three digit level of disaggregation we obtained estimates which led to impacts approximately 1.5 times m large as those obtained at the two-digit level. Similarly, the effects could be larger if we had disaggregated workers into more education categories. In particular, Borjm, Freeman and Katz (1992) find more powerful effects of immigration on the relative wages of workers with less than high-school education.
-.
In the United States, as we have seen, manufactured trade is highly differentiated along the lines of skill that is captured by measures of education. Manufactured exports are mncentrated in high-technology products with high ratios of college to high-school graduates, while imports, particular y those from developing countries, are concentrated in more basic industries in which skill ratios are low. Judged by educational attainment, Japan's patterns of industrial production and international specialization are much less distinctive than the US.
The share of the labor force with a high-school education or less is much higher in Japan than in the US and the range of the ratios of high-school to college graduates across industries is much narrower. One reason could be a greater reliance on on-the-job training for skills development, but this is not the only reason. As estimated by Kosai in Thygesen, Kosai and Lawrence (1996) , for example, the 78.1 percent share of high school workers in high-skill
Japanese industries, which account for 82.3 percent of all Japanese manufactured goods to developing countries, is not very different from the 88.0 percent share in basic industries, which account for just 18 percent of such exports. Moreover manufactured imports from developing countries are split evenly between these two categories.
The result is that net factor content analysis shows balanced expansions of trade having much smaller effects on the relative demand for workers with different education levels.
Indeed, eliminating all basic industries displaces 4.17 million high-school workers and 0.57 college workers, while replacing their value-added with output from the high-skill industries results in a demand for 3.39 high-school and 0.95 mllege. Overall, the economy wide ratio in the demand for high-school to college workers falls by just 2.03 percent --an impact of less a third than in the US. This analysis helps explain why Japanese concerns are more focused on hollowing out than growing wage inequality. These concerns reflect the perception that imports from developing countries are Ch a 11 eng ing Japanese firms with fairly sophisticated skill levels.
Part III: Conclusions
This exercise suggests that over a fifteen year period, rapid increases in US trade with developing countries could depress the relative and absolute wages of unskilled US workers.
Given an increase in productivity and growth in the labor force, the decline in real wages would be about 2.5 percent. This effect would be mitigated by an additional 0.8 percent boost b=use of wage premiums in the export sector.
In an economy in which average real wage growth was fairly strong, this type of change, of between a sixth and a third of a percent a year, would not be a major issue --particularly if there were other positive effects on the less skilled because of other changes in the labor market. If average real wages in the US were to rise by one percent per year due to higher domestic productivity, workers could absorb the change due to trade and still experience real earnings growth of between 0.84 and 0.67 percent annually.
It should be emphasized, moreover, that this is an upper bound impact. It ignores the fact that trade may bring benefits by increasing scale mnomies, enhancing competition, transferring technology and increasing product diversity --all of which could -wages of boti high-school and college graduates. It also ignores the fact that poorer workers are more likely to consume the price-sensitive basic goods whose prices will fall a result of trade.
Moreover, once the eeonomy eliminates domestic production of the basic industries in which the developing countries special izes, additional increases in world supplies of these products would increase the real wages of all American workers by providing them with cheaper imports. 15Additional trade with developing countries would then not necessarily affect wage inequality in the USA, although given the relatively small overall shares of imported goods in mnsumption this effect should not be exaggerated.
Finally, this simulation about the future also contains an implicit, but very important lesson about the past. If the impact of very large shifts in trade in the future is likely to be relatively small, it suggests that the much smaller growth in trade with developing countries over the past fifteen yms is unlikely to have had the major impact on labor markets in the OECD which many claim it has, 15 If the developing muntries shift into high-skill products, on the other hand, the US terms of trade could decline and wages in the US would become more equal. (1)
(2) 
